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Documentation Index

Fetch the complete documentation index at: https://docs.qaos.machdel.com/llms.txt

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Session management vulnerabilities allow attackers to steal or forge session tokens, hijacking authenticated user sessions without knowing the user’s password.

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session-id-in-url

Critical What it is Session identifiers appear in the URL as query parameters (e.g., ?sessionid=abc123, ;jsessionid=xyz), making them visible in browser history, server logs, referrer headers, and shared links. Why it matters A URL containing a session ID can be:
  • Leaked through the HTTP Referer header to third-party sites
  • Stored in browser history and accessible to other users of the same machine
  • Captured in server access logs
  • Accidentally shared in a screenshot or copy-pasted link
Any of these scenarios results in session hijacking without any active attack. How QAOS detects it The agent inspects the current URL after every navigation for parameters that resemble session identifiers: sessionid, session, sid, token, jsessionid, PHPSESSID, and similar patterns. Examples 
https://app.example.com/dashboard?sessionid=abc123def456
https://app.example.com/page;jsessionid=ABCDEFG1234567
https://app.example.com/home?sid=user_9876token
How to fix Store session identifiers exclusively in cookies with the HttpOnly and Secure flags set. Never pass session tokens through URLs. If you inherit a legacy system that uses URL-based sessions, migrate to cookie-based sessions and implement SameSite=Strict or SameSite=Lax.

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session-id-in-hidden-field

High What it is Session identifiers are embedded in hidden form fields or client-accessible DOM elements (e.g., <input type="hidden" name="session_id">), making them readable by any JavaScript on the page. Why it matters Hidden form fields are part of the DOM and accessible via JavaScript just like any other element. An XSS vulnerability anywhere on the page can extract the session ID from a hidden field and exfiltrate it to an attacker-controlled server. How QAOS detects it The agent scans the DOM for hidden input fields and client-side metadata whose names or values match session identifier patterns (session_id, token, auth, sid, etc.). Examples 
<!-- Session ID in hidden field — readable by any JS on page -->
<form action="/submit" method="POST">
  <input type="hidden" name="session_id" value="abc123def456">
</form>
How to fix Never embed session identifiers in the DOM. Store session state server-side and reference it exclusively through HttpOnly cookies that JavaScript cannot read. If you need to pass a CSRF token through a form field, use a separate, purpose-limited CSRF token rather than the session ID itself.

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session-id-reused-after-authentication

High What it is The session identifier is not rotated when a user logs in — the same session ID that existed before authentication is used for the authenticated session. This creates a session fixation vulnerability. Why it matters In a session fixation attack, an attacker plants a known session ID in the victim’s browser (e.g., via a malicious link or XSS). If the application reuses that session ID after login, the attacker’s known ID becomes authenticated and they gain access to the victim’s account. How QAOS detects it The agent captures the session cookie value before login, completes the authentication flow, then compares the session cookie value afterwards. If the value is unchanged, session fixation is possible. How to fix Issue a fresh session ID immediately after successful authentication: 
# FastAPI / Starlette — invalidate old session, create new one
request.session.clear()
request.session["user_id"] = user.id
# The framework issues a new session cookie automatically

# Express.js with express-session
req.session.regenerate((err) => {
  req.session.userId = user.id
})

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missing-session-invalidation

High What it is Logging out does not invalidate the server-side session. The session cookie remains valid after sign-out, allowing a user (or attacker who captured the cookie) to continue using the authenticated session. Why it matters If a user logs out on a shared computer, or if their session cookie was previously stolen, the attacker retains access indefinitely. Proper session invalidation is the only way to guarantee that a logout actually ends the session. How QAOS detects it The agent captures the session cookie, performs a logout, then attempts to access authenticated pages using the captured cookie. If access is still granted, session invalidation is missing. How to fix Invalidate the server-side session on logout — deleting the session record from the store, not just clearing the cookie client-side: 
# FastAPI / Starlette
request.session.clear()  # removes session data server-side

# Express.js
req.session.destroy((err) => {
  res.clearCookie('connect.sid')
  res.redirect('/login')
})
Clearing the cookie on the client is not sufficient — the server must reject the session ID even if the client sends it.